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Abstract
Economists and politicians in Sweden stated in the early 1990s that devaluations of the country’s
currency had lessened the external pressure on manufacturing and led to a delay in structural change
and rationalizations. The theory of transformation pressure generalizes the idea that productivity
growth in firms is promoted by intense competition, cost pushes and low product demand. The main
challenge faced by such a theory is to explain why it seems that an immediate threat is needed to get a
productive response from firms. Three separate explanations are presented here emphasizing either the
value of waiting to get more information about potential threats, the irrational tendency to ignore
threats until they show up or the stimulation of individual creativity when firms are put under real
pressure. But productivity growth is not always promoted by tight external circumstances. Growth may
be maximized if pressure in each period is moderate or if periods with strong pressure are followed by
periods of financial and technical consolidation, scale advantages and lesser needs to spend resources
on rationalization in order to survive.
JEL classification: D24; D81; L16; L21; N64; O31
Keywords: Transformation Pressure; Competition; X-inefficiency; Innovations; Productivity; Growth;
Irrationality; Uncertainty; R&D investments
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1.  Introduction
Average labor productivity growth was relatively low in Swedish industries from the
mid1970s to the early 1990s.
2 A government expert commission emphasized in the
early 1990s that productivity growth had been low in Sweden because of a weak
transformation pressure. Above all, repeated devaluations of the Swedish crown
(SEK) had delayed rationalization and structural change in the exposed sector
(Produktivitetsdelegationen, 1992). The conclusion was based on some crude
indicators but also on time series analysis showing that actual profits had a delayed
negative effect on labor productivity in several industries on the two and three-digit
levels (Erixon, 1991b, pp. 349-356). Devaluations in the early 1980s had led to a
profit boom in Swedish manufacturing.
In the early 1990s, Swedish politicians, including those who had been responsible for
economic policy in the two preceding decades, unequivocally accepted the hypothesis
that productivity growth in Sweden had been hampered by devaluations. They used
the concept transformation pressure when arguing for a hard-currency policy and also
for deregulations, EU integration and a more rigorous anti-trust legislation. A political
resistance to reductions in pay-roll taxes and floating exchange rates until late 1992
was inter alia based on a conviction that transformation pressure must be kept high to
raise productivity growth. The resistance was later accused of having contributed to
the sharp decline in Swedish GDP growth 1991-1993. But the argument for
transformation pressure was confirmed by a remarkable recovery in labor productivity
growth in Swedish manufacturing in the first half of the 1990s; the deep recession, the
high rates of interest and the hard-currency policy induced the firms to use the large
potentials for rationalization that had been built up in the 1980s and to speed up the
introduction of new work organizations. Further, an exceptional elimination of low-
productivity units took place in Swedish manufacturing in the early 1990s,
contributing, although to a lesser degree than rationalization (and labor substitution),
to the recovery in labor productivity growth  (Erixon, 2001).
                                                       
2 Sweden also experienced large losses of market shares, e.g. for R&D-intensive products, in this
period despite relatively low unit labor costs (Erixon, 1989, 1991a,b and Edquist, 1991). Sweden’s3
Attempts were made by Swedish economists in the 1990s to formulate a theory of
transformation pressure including a theory of a relationship between exchange-rate
policies and productivity growth (Erixon, 1991b, 1995 and 1998). The theoretical
work was facilitated by a unique Swedish tradition in economics integrating business
cycle and growth analysis with Johan Åkerman, Erik Dahmén and Ingvar Svennilson
as outstanding representatives (see Åkerman, 1960, Dahmén, 1970, Svennilson, 1954,
Carlsson and Henriksson, 1991). The notion of transformation pressure was first used
by Dahmén in distinguishing prime driving forces in an evolutionary process. The
Swedish postwar model of economic policy – the Rehn-Meidner model - also
influenced the development of a theory of transformation pressure. The model
assumes that profit squeezes through solidaristic wage policy and fiscal restraint will
speed up structural change and put a rationalization pressure on ineffective firms
(Erixon, 2000, 2001).
Investments may be enhanced by a reduction in expected and actual profits in the
theory of transformation pressure. In contrast, investments are generally stimulated by
high expected profits in modern macroeconomics. Further, in Keynesian models, high
actual aggregate demand and profits have a positive impact on capacity-augmenting
investments reflecting the importance of the accelerator, backward-looking
expectations or the desire of self-finance. Devaluations and other expansionary
stabilization-policy measures can then start a continuous recovery process and even a
virtuous growth circle (Kalecki, 1965, Harrod, 1970, Steindl, 1979, Greenwald and
Stiglitz, 1993). Besides, total factor productivity is stimulated if static scale
advantages prevail or if investments embody new technologies and products (dynamic
scale advantages). Thus, in Keynesian models, high actual profits and demand will
stimulate, not impede, productivity growth as in the theory of transformation pressure.
The new growth theory scrutinizes the role of ‘opportunities’ rather than ‘pressures’
exactly as the Keynesian growth theory. For example, new-growth theorists focus on
the market-enlarging and cost-reducing, not the market-rivalry, aspects of a
relationship between trade and growth. Extended markets through trade will increase
the amount of R&D investments leading to higher sustainable growth rates through
                                                                                                                                                              
slow productivity growth and losses of market shares were modest, however, if Japan is excluded from
the group of reference countries.4
non-diminishing returns in R&D activities, knowledge spillover effects and learning
by doing or learning by using effects (Romer, 1990, Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991,
Grossman and Helpman, 1991, 1994).
3 Trade will even promote growth in a small
country by stimulating the R&D sector according to Gene Grossman’s and Elhanan
Helpman’s growth model. But the expansion of the R&D sector is here caused by a
release of resources (skilled workers) from other sectors leading to lower innovation
costs, not by a stronger transformation pressure. On the contrary, R&D investments
will be depressed, ceteris paribus, by international competition; the profitability of
R&D decreases when foreign competition is intensified, a relationship that for a small
country will outweigh the positive trade effects on this profitability from enlarged
markets.
4
The theory of X-inefficiencies, and the related principal-agent theory, assumes that
tighter external circumstances (mostly harder competition) lead to stronger efforts in
firms to increase productivity. But the theory does not emphasize, as the theory of
transformation pressure, that external threats must be immediate t o  a d j u s t  f i r m
behavior to profit maximization. Moreover, the focus in the X-inefficiency literature
is on allocative inefficiencies and on individual firms and industries, not on
innovations and national growth (cf. Leibenstein, 1979, Frantz, 1992). Neo-
Schumpeterians and other industrial economists have argued in X-inefficiency terms
that firms suffering from a hard competitive pressure are enforced to be more
innovative in order to survive. But they rather stress that intense competition has a
negative impact on innovations. R&D investments will be low when the number of
(small) producers is large and entry barriers are low since expected innovation profits
and the probability of being the successful innovator become too small and the costs
of failure too large. Further, the efficiency of R&D investments is hampered by fierce
competition (potential or real) if there are significant returns to scale in R&D or a
                                                       
3 A market-enlargement argument for a positive relationship between economic integration and
productivity can also be found in (Horn, Lang and Lundgren, 1995). The authors refer, from a
principal-agent perspective, to the extended use of X-inefficiencies. The reference is controversial - it
is ‘pressures’ rather than ‘opportunities’ that lead to stronger efforts in the theory of X-inefficiencies.
4 Grossman and Helpman (1991, pp. 152-154 and Ch. 9, 1994, pp. 38-41). Grossman and Helpman do
discuss a case where trade stimulates growth through intensified competition. But the argument that
trade will result in stronger incentives to invent unique products concerns the efficiency of R&D
investments - a duplication of research can be avoided - not directly the amount of R&D investments.5
duplication of R&D projects (Scherer, 1984, p. 291, Scherer and Ross, 1990, pp. 637,
643, Scherer, 1992, p. 1420, Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
5
In the exceptional cases of macroeconomic analysis by neo-Schumpeterians, higher
aggregate demand and profits will mostly stimulate productivity growth not curb it as
in the theory of transformation pressure. Neo-Schumpeterians have a strong
preference for Jacob Schmookler’s invention theory – high demand will promote
R&D investments (and other inventive activities) through its positive effects on
expected sales but also by improving the capabilities of self-financing (Schmookler,
1966, 1972, pp. 76-77). In the Nelson-Winter model of virtuous growth circles for
firms, initial innovation profits will lead to new innovations by facilitating R&D
spending (assuming scale advantages in R&D), not reduce the incentives and
efficiency of R&D investments as suggested in the theory of transformation pressure.
The ultimate purpose of the Nelson-Winter model is to explain macroeconomic
growth; the role of ‘opportunities’ is accentuated here by the assumption that
innovations by leading firms are gradually imitated by other firms (see Nelson and
Winter, 1978, pp. 525-541, Nelson, 1981, p. 1060, Nelson, 1995, pp. 68-72).
The integration of neo-Schumpeterian and new-growth models in recent years has
meant a growing support to a theory that more competition is growth enhancing. The
idea that firms’ R&D efforts to get a lead over market rivals will increase if (neck-
and-neck) competition is intensified (Aghion, Harris and Vickers, 1997, Aghion and
Howitt, 1998) is compatible with the theory of transformation pressure. Further,
empirical studies have uncovered the importance of either domestic competition
(Porter, 1990) or global competition (Baily and Gersbach, 1995) for international
competitiveness and differences in productivity between countries. There is also
scope in (Aghion and Howitt, 1998, Ch. 8) for a ‘Swedish’ hypothesis that
devaluations, or other stimulants of aggregate demand, will hamper economic growth.
But there is no general theory of transformation pressure in the Anglo-Saxon growth
literature. Finally, modern growth theory has not yet considered the qualitative
                                                       
5  In addition, investments in R&D may be stronger on markets with few producers if the possibilities
to benefit from positive spillovers between various R&D programs, spread risk and raise (cheap)
external capital are larger in big companies (Scherer and Ross, pp. 652, Scherer, 1992, p. 1422).6
difference between actual and expected threats as a trigger of productivity-improving
measures.
Some basic notions and assumptions are presented in Section 2. A microeconomic
theory of transformation pressure is then outlined in Section 3. My aim is to give a
microeconomic contribution to the theories of Åkerman, Dahmén and Svennilson.
The possibility that firm’s productivity growth is stimulated by a higher actual
pressure is explained in terms of human behavior, skill and creativity. Here I am
inspired by the theory of investment under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994,
Hubbard, 1994) and by a psychological research that has attracted the interest of
modern choice theorists (see Rabin, 1998, Rabin and Schrag, 1999, O’Donoghue and
Rabin, 1999) but not yet that of modern growth economists. Further, growth models
have yet not explored the possibility that the productive capacity of individuals can be
improved by troublesome external conditions. Objections by psychologists and
economic historians to an absolute theory of transformation pressure are presented in
Section 4. The objections are reasonable enough to justify the formulation of a
modified theory of transformation pressure in Section 5. In fact, the main contribution
of Swedish industrial economics is not the theory that productivity growth is
encouraged by hard external circumstances but the distinction between positive and
negative driving forces in growth studies.
2.  Central concepts and assumptions in the theory of transformation
      pressure
The central hypothesis in this paper is that firms’ productivity growth will be raised
by a harder transformation pressure but only if this pressure is manifest or within near
sight. This hypothesis constitutes the ‘theory’ of transformation pressure together with
a subset of related hypotheses and explanations primarily based on psychological and
historical evidence. The notion of ‘transformation’ covers the introduction of new
products, production technologies and work organizations but also new modes of
management, marketing, distribution, stock keeping, administration and finance. The
definition is akin to the one of innovations in industrial economics - it only includes
changes in firms that, more or less intentionally, lead to increases in total factor7
productivity.
6 But ‘transformation’ also includes rationalization, thus (every-day)
efforts by firms to raise total factor productivity within the existing structure of
products, technologies and organizations.
7
A transformation is possible either through a major change of product patterns,
technologies and organizations or by following a familiar growth trajectory. The first
strategy is defined as a radical transformation (strategic reconstructing) and the
second one as a status quo strategy. Firms following a status quo strategy are
occupied with rationalization and small changes in products, technologies and
organizations. The question is kept open whether the transformation process is shaped
by a status quo strategy or by attempts to generate and adopt radical innovations. Both
strategies lead to sustainable productivity growth in a country if there are non-
decreasing returns on R&D investments in single firms or knowledge spillover and
learning effects. But the spillover and learning effects are supposed to be stronger
with a radical transformation. It can even be questioned that rationalization will lead
to any sustainable growth at all. However, downsizing may facilitate the financing of
R&D investments and also be associated with organizational changes that raise the
incentives and acceptances of technical change in the firms. Besides, rationalization
can be decisive for measured productivity growth during a particular decade.
Transformation pressure will increase if competition in product markets is intensified,
for instance if other firms become more capable or willing to produce and use new
ideas. A harder transformation pressure can also reflect a reduction in exogenous
product demand or stronger customer claims on better products and services. Finally,
a stronger pressure will emerge if prices on labor, raw materials, energy and capital
are raised by other reasons than the firm’s own demand for production factors. In the
case of exogenous nominal wage increases, the firm has strong incentives not only to
                                                       
6 Switches to new regional markets are excluded by this productivity criterion unless they are
associated with scale advantages or improvements in product quality. The criterion also excludes
attempts by firms to circumvent external threats by market collusion or political actions to get
subsidies, tax redemption or sheltered market positions. Further, mergers and take-overs to exploit
economies of scale within industries are not counted as transformation from my microeconomic
perspective.
7 Schumpeter probably considered rationalization as an example of organizational innovations (cf.
Schumpeter, 1962, p. 66). However, labor substitution is not covered by my notion of rationalization
above.8
substitute machines for labor in production and to upgrade labor by on-the-job
training. Limited mark-up possibilities may also induce the firm to raise total factor
productivity by innovations or reductions in internal inefficiencies through either
general measures or specific ones to economize on labor.
The three dimensions of transformation pressure – competition, cost pushes and low
(and qualified) product demand - can be affected by economic policy or by
regulations such as environmental and anti-trust legislation. A necessary condition is
that disquilibrium states caused by separate policy measures, or exogenous market
changes, will last for a relatively long time due to rigidities on commodity, labor and
financial markets. For example, lower profits in the exposed sector through a
revaluation are not supposed to be offset at once by lower nominal wages.
8 Further, I
will not assume that exogenous changes in product and factor markets are
immediately counter-balanced by exchange-rate adjustments in a system with floating
exchange rates.
Hence, firms suffering from a tougher environment are not supposed to get any
immediate relief by offsetting political measures or market adjustments. Productivity
growth will then increase according to the theory of transformation pressure. In fact,
aggregate productivity growth will increase whether the firms are transformed or not.
A phasing-out of business activities and an elimination of firms (and production units)
because of negative external events will release resources to be used by firms (and
production units) with higher productivity levels or productivity growth. I will not pay
any further attention to this uncontroversial (orthodoxian Schumpeterian) explanation
for a positive relationship between external pressure and productivity. The focus in
this paper is on the productivity performance of individual firms.
A central assumption in the theory of transformation pressure is that future threats
against the firms are inevitable. For example, monopolists will face future challenges
in the form of product substitution and higher factor prices associated with the
expansion of new firms. However, firms are supposed not to react on outside threats
                                                       
8 For instance, it took more than half a decade before the profits from the Swedish devaluations in the
early 1980s were eliminated by increases in nominal wages (cf. Lindbeck, 1993, pp. 81-82).9
until they had shown up or are within near sight. The hypothesis is controversial since
it seems that rational managers and owners ought to take steps already in good times
to ensure the survival of the firms when future threats are inevitable.
3.  Microeconomic foundation
A theory of transformation pressure must be build up in two steps. First, I have to
explain why productivity growth in a representative firm is stimulated by a decline in
expected profitability. I will concentrate here on the possibility that investments are
promoted by lower expected profits; I assume throughout the analysis that
investments lead to higher total factor productivity. Second, I must demonstrate why
an immediate external threat, leading to a reduction in actual profits, is needed to get a
productive response from firms.
I will briefly explore three explanations for why investments can be stimulated by a
reduction in expected profits. First, firms can meet worse prospects on particular
product markets by investing in other product areas. A firm’s total investment
expenditures may increase if the transition to new markets is associated with high
fixed costs. Second, investments can be promoted by discouraging prospects if
investments are strategic. Since investments are then governed by an ambition to stay
in business they may be unaffected and even promoted by negative net present values.
Strategic investments can reflect the prevalence of specific goals and competencies of
managers and other employees. Established owners may also strive for the survival of
the firm if they fear losses of prestige or have feelings of affinity.
Third, a negative relationship between expected profitability and investments may
reflect that the search for profitable investment options is stimulated by expected
challenges. Such efforts may in turn reflect the existence of firm and industry specific
goals and abilities (see above). Principal-agent models offer another explanation.
Fiercer competition may intensify the search for new investment opportunities if
managers’ expected income is a function of expected profits and income effects
dominate over leisure-substitution effects (cf. Scitovsky, 1943, Hermalin, 1992).10
But the theory of transformation pressure is more than an explanation for a positive
relationship between expected threats and productivity growth. A basic hypothesis is
that firms will only transform if the challenges are instantaneous. I will present three
explanations for why a threat must be real to be productivity-enhancing. The first two
explanations concern the incentives of managers, owners and workers while the third
one concerns the abilities of firm actors.
3.1.  The value of waiting
A hypothesis that firms must experience an obvious threat to rationalize, reorganize or
introduce new techniques and products is compatible with an assumption of rational
behavior under genuine uncertainty. A firm that waits and sees until the threat shows
up cannot be accused of being passive when future is veiled in complete obscurity. A
perfect certainty that threats will appear, in some disguise, is not enough to induce a
rational firm to transform. Managers’ and owners’ option to rule their thumbs until the
threat appears is probably the best choice when the character and extent of the
challenges are unknown. For example, the risk is impending that impatient firms will
make the wrong decisions (investments) in the light of subsequent decisions by
competitors; established firms might have put all their R&D resources in product
differentiation on markets where new process technologies later appeared to be the
big challenge by newcomers. I will consistently assume in this section that switches
from one transformation strategy to another are associated with heavy investments
and long delays and that investments are irreversible (have sunk costs).
Hence, rational firms will not transform until a negative event has actually taken place
if the character and size of future threats cannot be accurately predicted. It may even
be rational to continue waiting after the appearance of the threat. The nature of a
challenge is not always unveiled by its appearance. A firm must find out whether a
negative demand or cost shock is firm specific or industry specific and also whether
the threat is temporary or permanent. For example, a revaluation of the currency is
only an incentive for transformation if it gradually becomes obvious for the firms that
market adjustments will be slow or that new revaluations will occur. Rational firms
may even postpone reacting when the character of a threat has been revealed by its
appearance. The extent of a challenge cannot always be distinguished at once. For11
example, entry by a new innovative firm is not automatically a threat to established
firms. A response by the latter firms is only necessary if it successively becomes clear
that the new firm has a large market potential (Utterback, 1994, pp. 162-163).
The theory of transformation pressure above does not exclude that rational firms will
transform even if the true nature and consequences of the external challenges are not
fully known. Firms must often respond before having complete information about the
character and scale of competitive challenges since the risk may be overwhelming that
they react too late. (See the assumption above that strategy changes are costly and
slow.) Further, firms may take productivity-improving measures if they expect that a
revaluation will be followed by new ones or that the following wage adjustment
process is slow or incomplete. Hence, I do not preclude the possibility that firms make
decisions on the basis of expectations. The assumption is made in this section that
firms are rational in the sense that they learn from new experiences. This assumption
is also made in the rational-expectation theory in macroeconomics and also in Herbert
Simon’s theory of procedural rationality. According to Simon, firms are rational if
they learn by experience, that is, if they make better decisions when the consequences
of their older ones have become obvious (Simon, 1978, pp. 8-9). But the theory of
transformation pressure in this section also claims that investments are delayed by
rational decision-makers who want to get more information about the true nature and
consequences of a potential threat. The hypothesis that firms in a world of large
uncertainties will improve the quality of their decisions by waiting has no
correspondence in the rational-expectation theory or in Simon’s theory.
9
Uncertainty can explain the value of waiting for a real external pressure but also the
choice of a status quo strategy instead of a radical transformation. Firms may avoid
the latter option if they are risk averse at the existence of instrument uncertainty thus,
at difficulties to predict the consequences of their own actions. Managers and owners
                                                       
9 Simon’s theory gives a larger room than the rational-expectation theory for decisions that appeared to
be wrong in retrospect. It is unlikely that firms will make the best decisions if the economy is
characterized by large uncertainties and difficulties to foresee the consequences of their actions. Simon
refers here to substantive irrationality, not to probabilities and attitudes to risk, which makes this part of
his theory similar to Keynes’ v iew  in  t he  General Theory (Keynes, 1936, Ch. 12). The theory of
transformation pressure, however, makes a clear distinction between the cases of genuine uncertainty
and irrationality. In next section, I will explain a positive relationship between an immediate outside
threat and productivity in terms of (substantive) irrationality. Here, waiting will not improve the quality
of decisions as in the section above.12
have often more information about the effects of a status quo like strategy than of a
radical transformation (cf. Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993, p. 28). However, a status
quo option may be less attractive for a risk averse firm if uncertainty about the
associated external threats and their consequences is high compared with that at a
radical transformation.
The theory of transformation pressure in this section has strong resemblance with the
theory of investment under uncertainty. The theories share the assumption that
investments are irreversible and possible to postpone. The assumption in the theory of
transformation pressure that threats are inevitable in the future has a clear
correspondence in the theory of investment under uncertainty. In the latter theory, the
change in the value of an investment V over a time interval dt can be expressed as
follows:
dV  =  α  V dt  +  σ  V dz  –  V dq,
where  α  is a constant showing trend value growth, dz is the increment of a
continuous-time stochastic Wiener process (Brownian motion) and σ  is a constant
showing the degree of uncertainty about future returns (net benefits). dq is the
increment of a (non-continuous) Poisson process, permitting ‘downward jumps’ at
some random point in time in the value of an investment V through negative events
with a mean arrival rate λ  (dq and dz are assumed to be independent). Negative events
such as entries and innovations by incumbent firms lead to a fall in q by some fixed
percentage  φ  (where 0 ≤   φ   ≤  1) with probability 1. Thus, V will decline with
probability λ  dt to (1 - φ ) times its original value. Firms get information over time by
observing changes in V, but Vs in future periods are always uncertain (Dixit and
Pindyck, pp. 63-65, 95-97 and Ch. 5).
The criterion for investing now in the theory of investment under uncertainty is V > I
+ F(V) where I is the sunk costs of an investment and F(V) the value of an option to
invest, an opportunity that is lost when the investment is made.  The date when the
option should be used can be determined by dynamic programming. The optimal13
value F(V) is determined as F(V) = A V
β  where A is a constant and β  (>1) depends on
the parameters α , φ , λ  and σ  (and the discount rate).
The description of the theory of uncertainty above gives a representative picture of the
theory of transformation pressure in many respects. Both theories say that it may be
rational to postpone an investment to get more information about future demand, cost
and competitive conditions. For example, more uncertainty about the trend and
temporary components of a change in net benefits will increase the value of waiting.
In formal terms, a rise in uncertainty about future returns (σ ) leads to a higher F(V)
which will cause a delay in investments given the values of V and I. Further, the
assumption in the theory of transformation pressure that future (competitive) threats
are inevitable is covered by the special case λ  = 1 in the theory of investment under
uncertainty. But there are some differences between this theory and the theory of
transformation pressure.
In the theory of investment under uncertainty, a negative event (λ  > 0), or a higher
probability of a negative event (a higher λ ), in a certain period will reduce the value
of waiting. It is true that the variance of changes in V will increase leading, ceteris
paribus, to an increase in F(V). But this tendency at a negative event to wait rather
than invest now is more than offset by the fact that the expected value of an
investment will decrease (from α  to α -λ ) which reduces F(V) that means a smaller
opportunity cost of investing now rather than waiting – a delay would have meant that
the reduction in the cost of the investment (see the discount factor) had become
smaller (at a positive α ) than the decrease in net benefits (Dixit and Pindyck, pp. 171-
172). However, the theory of transformation pressure pronounces more strongly than
the theory of investment under uncertainty that the character and consequences of
possible threats are uncertain. For instance, in the latter theory, firms know from the
start whether a shock is industry specific or firm specific (cf. Dixit and Pindyck, Ch.
8). Further, the assumption that a fall in q (and therefore in V) at a negative event
occurs at a fixed percentage φ  (see the equation above) excludes the possibility that
the negative profit effect is stochastic. The arguments for a delay in investments
would have been strengthened if the size of the fall in q was a random variable. The
possibility of a stochastic Poisson process is discussed in the theory of investment14
under uncertainty, but the calculation of the optimal investment rules is seen as too
complicated in this case (Dixit and Pindyck, pp. 85 and 173).
Another difference between the theory of investment under uncertainty and the theory
of transformation is that investments in the former theory can be promoted by a
reduction in expected profits (V > I is not even a necessary condition for investments)
even though it may be rational to delay investments to get more information. Stiffer
competition, lower product demand or higher variable costs may engender managerial
efforts to find new investment options or stimulate investments in new product
markets or in established ones in order to remain in business (see above). The theory
of investment under uncertainty claims on the other hand that investments will
unambiguously be hampered by the decline in expected profits when negative events
become more frequent, but also that this decline may be fully offset by an increase in
trend value growth (by an increase in α ). In this case, an increase in λ  will lead to a
delay in investments (F(V) will rise) exactly as in the theory of transformation
pressure (Dixit and Pindyck, 172-173).
A theory of transformation pressure saying that firms will postpone a reaction on
future threats to get more information has some limitations. First, the extent and
character of some future challenges can be predicted with a relatively high degree of
precision; the firms will not get any further information by waiting. Second, a radical
transformation may be a virtue even at genuine uncertainty. Firms’ competitive
strength is to a large extent defined by their ability to adjust instantaneously to
unexpected events. By the introduction of flexible technologies and organizations, a
firm shows good preparedness to meet potential threats rather than good
predictability. Thus, it may be logic to claim that foreseeing investments have been
made in this case despite the fact that firms will not react on external events before
they are in near sight. A theory that firms will not invest in new products,
technologies and organizations until the threats have shown up because of large
uncertainties cannot be the theory of transformation pressure. It remains to explain,
for instance, why some firms postpone the introduction of flexible technologies and
organizations to a date when the external pressure is actually raised. A general theory
of transformation pressure must refer to a psychological mechanism that makes firm15
actors too optimistic about a status-quo strategy, too inclined to take risks by choosing
this strategy or simply make them unwilling (and even unable) to fully consider the
long-run gains from other strategies unless the firm is put under a stronger real
pressure.
3.2.  The psychology of a resistance to change
The second explanation for why external threats must be manifest to encourage
productivity growth represents a challenge to conventional maximization models in
economics. The resistance to change in this section is synonymous with a resistance to
a radical transformation bearing in mind that a status quo strategy can include
measures to increase productivity growth. Psychological research provides
explanations for why firms may have a bias for a status-quo strategy. Under
uncertainty, managers and main owners may overestimate the profitability of a status
quo strategy, especially if the firms have been successful in the past, and choose a
risky status quo option that is inferior in terms of expected profitability. Further,
managers may resist, emotionally or by indolence, a radical transformation that will
increase not only profits and the probability of survival of their firm but also their
intertemporal well-being. The notions of self-deception, risk seeking and irrationality
are crucial at my second attempt to explain why a transformation will not occur until
the firms are obviously put under an external pressure. I will first discuss the
possibility that firm actors make too optimistic judgements of a status quo strategy,
especially when actual profits are high.
Assume that firm actors initially choose a status-quo strategy on ‘instrumental-
certainty’ grounds, hence, the choice is basically explained by employees’ and main
owners’ knowledge of existing technologies, products and organizations. This
assumption is justified by psychological studies emphasizing the importance of habits
(and unity) in decision-making (Eiser and Pligt, 1988, Ch. 2, Yates, 1992). But
managers and main owners may be too confident about driving the firm into old
wheel-tracks. A reasonable hypothesis is that people, once having made a strategic
choice, will ignore new information or stop searching for other options even if
information costs are negligible. Further, people may interpret additional information
in a way that confirms the chosen strategy thus, they have a confirmatory bias. Both16
hypotheses are supported by psychological studies. There is also evidence in the
psychological literature that the confirmatory bias makes individuals too confident
about the chosen strategy. (See the literature survey in (Rabin, pp. 26-32) and (Rabin
and Schrag, pp. 37-47).) The tendency to overestimate the profitability of a status quo
strategy is probably accentuated if the firms have been profitable in the past. Owners
and managers may be stunned by earlier successes and lulled into a sense of security
when historical profits are high; for instance, main owners may not endeavor to find
out whether the success of the firms is due to favorable external conditions or
management competence. Firm actors may also be overconfident about their ability to
ward off potential threats when actual profits are high.
The risk that firm actors will overestimate their abilities and become intoxicated by
earlier successes is probably higher if high historical profits depend on favorable
external conditions, such as an undervalued currency, rather than on a radical
transformation in the past. Easily earned incomes can easily be confused with
incomes from a dynamic behavior. For example, firms may become too confident
about the prospects of a status quo strategy after a devaluation. They may overreact
on ‘excess profits’ and neglect their short duration. Psychological experiments have
confirmed that people put too much weight on extreme and recent events and also on
events of short durability (Kahneman, 1994). It is true that recent outcomes would
have been a rational basis for expectations if they were not exceptional. For example,
the choice of a status quo strategy is rational in the devaluation case if firms have
learnt that any tendency to a profit decline will always be met by new devaluations.
However, there is no strong evidence in the psychological literature that the
estimation biases above will be corrected by learning, not even by experts, when
predictability is low (Rabin, pp. 31-32).
The theory of transformation pressure claims that firm actors will abandon a
propensity to ignore and misinterpret new information and an ungrounded sense of
stability and personal quality favoring a status quo position when their firms are
actually put under a stronger external pressure. A full (or almost full) certainty of a
threat is thus assumed to be the only effective mean of sobering down. For example,
new information about the profit consequences of different options will not be
misread anymore when a threat has actually appeared. The sobering-down process17
will lead to a radical transformation if firm actors see this strategy as the correct one
in light of the unambiguous signals of tighter external circumstances (cf. Rabin and
Schrag, pp. 48-62).
The psychological studies cited above confirm that firm actors can be too confident
about a chosen status quo strategy especially if the firm has been successful in the
past; expected profits from this strategy are overestimated by self-deceptive actors.
But firms may also sustain a status quo strategy that is inferior in terms of expected
profitability if the actors are extremely risk-prone. It is possible that firms are more
willing to choose a risky status quo option if they have been profitable in the past. The
psychological literature emphasizes that attitudes to risk may be influenced by earlier
choices (see Eiser and Pligt, and Yates, Ch. 2 cited above). Empirical studies have not
unambiguously shown that well-performing organizations prefer options that are more
risky (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, pp. 286-288, Davis, Kameda and Stasson, 1992,
pp. 191-192). But a theory of transformation pressure claiming that decision-makers
become more risk averse under pressure is supported by psychological evidence
(Mann, 1992, pp. 213-215).
Psychologists often refer to Pearl Harbor of December 1941 when illustrating a status
quo bias in decision-making. The U.S. Naval Commander (and his advisors) resisted a
full alert and an evacuation in spite of a high probability of a Japanese attack. The
Commander’s choice of status quo showed that he underestimated the risks and costs
of an attack. Further, by choosing the status quo, the Commander took up a risk-prone
attitude. He put a low decision weight on the certain costs of an evacuation but
underweighted the much higher costs of a probable attack (cf. Davis, Kameda and
Stasson, pp. 189-190).
10
However, there is no need yet to completely abandon the assumptions of profit and
utility maximization. The choice of a status quo position in the firm case can reflect
that profit expectations are distorted, which certainly is true when strategy decisions
                                                       
10 The status quo position by the U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor has been explained in the psychological
literature (see Davis, Kameda and Stasson) by ‘groupthink’, that is by conformity pressures and shared
illusions within a small cohesive group. The risk of groupthink is overwhelming if the group is
dominated by powerful leaders or lacks clear decision-making procedures. Psychological studies have
shown that decisions by (small) groups may be more extreme (risk-prone) than individual decisions.18
are based on exceptional outcomes in the past, but decision-makers may at least have
had the ambition to maximize expected profits and also utilities. Further, the choice of
a risky status quo alternative despite low expected profits may not challenge the
principle of profit and utility maximization but rather the conventional assumption of
concave utility functions in economics which excludes options that imply a large risk
for a considerable decline in utility.
11 (A concave utility function reflects that the
utility gains from a higher income will gradually be smaller.) I will argue in X-
inefficiency terms below that a profit decline is connected with a reduction in
managers’ consumption, comfort and prestige.
Psychologists have used the Pearl Harbor example to demonstrate that a status quo
choice can be completely irrational. The decision to stay at the marine base was
associated not only with a significant risk of human and capital losses but also with a
reduction in the set of possible military actions in the future at a Japanese attack. It is
obvious that the risk-inclined and overconfident attitude at Pearl Harbor favoring a
status quo strategy largely reflected that other alternatives were associated with short-
run personal sacrifices in the form of efforts and discomfort. It seems that the
Commander (who was later dismissed) did not weight the disutilities of an alert and
evacuation against the long-run gains of this option, inter alia for himself. There are
other psychological evidence that people tend to put a too strong weight on initial
utility losses in relation to long-term utility gains at a departure from status quo and to
procrastinate options with immediate costs in general (Rabin, pp. 33-34, O’Donoghue
and Rabin, 1999). Analogously, firm actors may overweight the short-run utilities of a
status quo position, a tendency that inter alia could explain an overconfident and risk-
prone attitude to this alternative.
                                                       
11 Here I also assume, in contrast to the psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, that the
room for ‘framing effects’ in market economies is small (cf. Kahneman and Tversky, 1987, pp. 87-88).
Kahneman and Tversky emphasize the importance of framing effects in their experiments. People’s
ordering of options depends on whether the options are expressed in losses or gains reflecting that
people are risk seeking in terms of losses but risk averse in terms of gains. These framing effects
violate a necessary condition for rational behavior (see Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979, 1987,
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1991). The effects can be avoided in the firm case if comparisons of
gains and losses are integrated by analyses of profits or the rate of survival. The choice situation has
now become more transparent, that is, decision-makers can more easily survey and evaluate which
alternatives are superior in terms of probabilities and outcomes.19
The principle of rational behavior is satisfied if individuals with coherent and stable
preferences maximize their utilities given a set of options. Expected utilities (and
profits) are estimated by weighting the outcomes of different options with their
respective probabilities. The maximization principle is not really challenged by
Harvey Leibenstein in his criticism of conventional microeconomic theory. ‘Selective
rationality’ does not reflect any irrational behavior, only that managers and workers
abstain, under some circumstances, from profit maximization to satisfy their
individual interests (cf. Leibenstein, 1979, pp. 484-485, De Alessi, 1983).
A central assumption in the X-inefficiency literature is that an outside pressure will
reduce the divergence between profit and utility maximization behavior in the firms.
Expected future threats will lead to stronger managerial efforts if managers’ expected
incomes are a function of expected profitability (see the introduction to this section).
Further, managers’ incomes, comfort and prestige in the long run may depend on the
survival of the firm where he or she is actually employed; it can be difficult for
managers to get well-paid jobs with generous fringe benefits in the future if their
careers have been molded by closures. Thus, a utility-maximizing manager must have
incentives to reduce the probability of closures (or hostile takeovers), for instance, by
searching for the best investment options. But there is still too large scope for a
divergence between profit and utility maximization in the X-inefficiency literature
especially if future threats are supposed to be inevitable (see Section 2). First, a search
for radical transformation alternatives and the choice of one of them may be necessary
today to efficiently conquer threats of tomorrow if the effectuation of a new strategy
demands heavy investments and long learning periods. Hence, an immediate radical
transformation will probably increase the firms’ chances of being profitable and alive.
Second, high actual profits may enhance the possibilities to realize a radical
transformation by raising firms’ ability to finance investments by internal funds or
(cheap) external capital.
It is true that firms often strive for high production growth or larger market shares at
the expense of high actual profits for instance, by pursuing an aggressive price policy.
But the ultimate aim of the strategy is presumably to increase expected profits and the
chance of survival by eliminating actual rivals and deterring new ones. I will
concentrate on the cases where long run profitability and the survival of the firm are20
jeopardized by actual departures from profit maximization. Firm actors will not
always make an attempt to maximize profits in practice even if they embrace the goal
as a guideline by the simple fact that it is in their own interest.
12
Assume that decision-makers can, if they make some efforts, acquire reliable
information about the risks and profit consequences of different options and that they
are risk neutral. Further, let us assume that expected profitability is higher with a
radical transformation than with a status quo strategy and that the set of future options
is enlarged if the firms pursue a radical transformation.  A resistance to a radical
transformation cannot then be labeled rational even if the change is strenuous and
unpleasant. Managers (and also main stockholders) may have feelings of discomfort
against a radical transformation that demands efforts to search for alternatives,
reorganize the firm and create a consensus by persuading skeptical employees to
accept a change. They may also find it emotionally unpleasant to establish relations to
workers characterized by persuasions and threats inter alia of dismissals. Further,
managers may have strong feelings against a transformation that will challenge old
habits in the firm. For instance, habitual learning in the firms may reduce the
willingness, and also capacity, to assimilate new products and technologies. (This
negative aspect of learning by doing and learning by using is often overlooked in
industrial economics.)
It would of course have been rational for managers to resist a radical transformation if
the short run disutilities had outrun the long run utility gains. However, managers who
depart from the principle of profit maximization are not maximizing utility in a
dynamic perspective given the assumptions above and an earlier proposition that the
postponement of a radical transformation makes it difficult to meet threats in the
future. Managers’ (and owners’) resistance to a radical transformation may reflect the
lack of self-discipline. The theory of transformation pressure claims that firm actors
will regain their self-control first when the firm is hit by harder external
circumstances.
                                                       
12 I will thus not stress the principal-agent relation in the theory of transformation pressure. However, I
will not exclude the possibility, central in principal-agent models, that it is easier for owners to control
(monitor) managers on competitive markets because of greater opportunities for firm comparisons.
Under such market conditions, industry specific negative shocks will induce stronger managerial
efforts through harder pressures from owners (Nickell, Nicolitsas and Dryden, 1997, p. 785).21
Firm actors may also have difficulties to accurately predict their well being of a
radical transformation in the long run. If a radical transformation has actually taken
place, the remaining owners, managers and workers may gradually realize the benefits
of the change and also become habituated to the new situation. Hence, a radical
transformation, pursued by more self-disciplined decision-makers when the firm is
suffering from a higher real pressure, may unanimously be supported ex post by the
remaining actors. The adjustment process partly reflects that the actors’ preferences
have been altered at the departure from status quo hence, preferences are not stable as
assumed in conventional microeconomics.
In light of the psychological literature, a tendency by firm actors to give up a
reluctance to a radical transformation first when they experience a stronger external
pressure primarily reflects that they are enforced to become more rational. But
psychological studies cited above indicate that a radical transformation may also be
undertaken by firm actors who remain irrational after the appearance of an external
threat. As people tend to over-emphasize extreme and recent historical events and
ignore their short run duration when expectations are formed, a radical transformation
may be accomplished by firm actors who overreact on an actual decline in profits,
especially if the decline is exceptional. For example, a revaluation may lead to
excessive productivity-enhancing measures given the temporary character of the
decline in actual profits.
3.3.  Necessity is the mother of invention
The phrase that necessity is the mother of invention suggests that people becomes
more creative when they are put under a pressure. A hypothesis that troublesome
external conditions stimulate not only efforts but also creativity and skills is not far-
fetched for anthropologists and historians. According to Arnold Toynbee, the
development of higher civilizations has been stimulated, not hampered, by hard
geographical and climatic conditions, persecutions and catastrophes (Toynbee, 1949).
A corresponding hypothesis in growth economics says that the ability of new firms to
produce, assimilate and use new ideas will increase at an immediate pressure. It is
also possible that the innovative capacities of established firms are enhanced by hard22
external conditions. Thus, all firms that experience a profit decline may become more
capable combining productive forces in a way they have never thought of before. This
regeneration of firms may, inter alia, have a positive effect on the amount and
efficiency of R&D investments.
Conventional microeconomic theory considers that firms have incentives to use and
develop technologies that economize on scarce resources. But the theory of
transformation pressure takes a step further – it assumes that factor scarcity will
stimulate the ability to develop and adopt resource-saving technologies and
organizations. Industrial economists often refer to Japanese experiences - shortage of
raw materials and capital after World War II speeded up not only the use but also the
development of factor-saving technologies and organizations. Moreover, a theory that
firm creativity is stimulated by external pressure is not restricted to the cases of
resource scarcity and resource-saving activities. Firms are supposed be more
innovative in general if they are put under an external pressure whether its character.
The idea that innovations are stimulated by negative external events can be added to
other explanations for why the losers in World War II showed high economic growth
in the early postwar period. Traditional (neoclassical) growth theory highlights that
physical capital stocks were eliminated during the war, leading to high temporary
labor productivity growth, and to investments embodying new technologies (Solow,
1956 and 1964). The new growth theory emphasizes ‘opportunities’ s u c h  a s  t h e
survival of human capital when explaining a rapid recovery after a war (Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, 1995, pp. 200-201). The theory of transformation suggests that the low
productivity and welfare levels in Germany, Japan and Italy made the population
more creative. A related, although bolder, hypothesis is that the defeat in World War
II per se established a mental state that was favorable for industrial development. A
country’s industrial success can be formed by national disappointments and defeats in
general. An analogous microeconomic theory states that the mental strength of
managers and workers is boosted by firm failures.
A hypothesis that negative external events make firms and individuals more creative
is close to one saying that such events will increase the skill of managers and workers.
Firm actors might, for instance, become more capable to meet new competition if they23
have been persecuted by earlier threats. A positive relationship between experience
and the quality of human capital is considered in growth economics. But the
‘opportunity’ notion of learning by doing (and learning by using) in growth
economics must be supplemented with that of learning by hardship. The skills of
managers and workers may be improved by the experience of producing but also by
the experience of tough external conditions.
Innovations are engendered by transformation pressure both in the theory of an
individual resistance to change and in the theory where necessity is the mother of
invention. The difference between the theories is that efforts and attitudes of firm
actors are centered in the former theory, not their creativity and competence as in the
latter one. The proposition that individuals are strengthened mentally by
disappointments and defeats shows that the difference between the two theories is not
an absolute one. A separation between the theories is also difficult in practice, thus to
decide whether innovations enforced by real external threats are an act of will or a
reflection of enlarged abilities. Learning by hardship and creative thinking under the
gallows may require efforts and also shape the values of firm actors.
4.  Objections to a theory of transformation pressure
Despite my aim to formulate a general theory of transformation pressure, Section 3
does not cover all explanations  for a positive relationship between transformation
pressure and productivity growth of firms.
13 But more important, the theory of
transformation pressure is challenged by evidence of a negative relationship between
external pressure and productivity growth. I have already presented arguments in
industrial economics for a negative relationship between competition and innovations
                                                       
13 Section 3 did not refer to the idea that the opportunity cost of productivity-improving measures such
as reorganizations and training is reduced in a recession because of lower returns on productive
activities (Hall, 1991, Aghion and Howitt, 1998, pp. 240-242). The explanations above also exclude
that R&D efforts are stronger if there are many rivals because of greater prospects of temporary
monopoly profits. The theory is based on an assumption of symmetric market positions - the innovator
(first mover) will gain market shares in proportion to the total number of rivals (potential innovators).
Further, my ‘threat perspective’ excludes, together with my focus on firm behavior, theories that the
probability of a technological break-through will increase with the number of firms (Scherer and Ross,
pp. 636 and 643).24
- see the introduction. But there are also objections in psychology and history to an
absolute theory of transformation pressure.
A serious competitive threat may weaken a firm’s belief in the future and self-reliance
leading to inactivity and feelings of inferiority among managers and employees.
Further, intense competition, or other tight environments, may reduce the quality of
management and labor. Firm actors may perform worse and make hasty decisions.
One plausible argument, although infrequent in psychology and industrial economics,
is that a tough competitive climate makes learning by doing more difficult. Managers
and workers in industries characterized by a steady stream of innovations have no
time, or capacity, to assimilate all new knowledge. A more common argument in
psychology is that the quality of decision-making will deteriorate if managers become
stressed by high risks of large losses or insufficient time to search for profitable
options (cf. Mann, pp. 208-211). According to some psychologists, the stress from the
threat of a Japanese attack explains why the U.S. Naval Commander wrongly chose
an unnecessary risky option at Pearl Harbor (Davis, Kameda and Stasson, pp. 189-
191, Mann, pp. 201-202). Hence, this interpretation of the U.S. passivity at Pearl
Harbor put the blame on transformation pressure! However, the explanation is not
confirmed by psychological studies showing that decision-makers become more
cautious and risk averse under time pressure (Mann, pp. 213-215).
Swedish historians have claimed that decades with high transformation pressure are
characterized by rationalizations and labor substitution rather than by innovations and
capacity-augmenting investments (Schön, 1990, 1994, pp. 16-21). Hence, periods
with a hard external pressure are dominated by measures leading to higher
productivity levels rather than to sustainable growth. Some industrial economists
support the view that the strategies are mutually exclusive. Firms must make a choice
between  ‘differentiation’ and cost effectiveness (Porter, 1990, pp. 37-38).
14 The
question is why rationalization seems to be chosen instead of a radical transformation
                                                       
14 All industrial economists do not share the conclusion that the strategies are mutually exclusive. The
conflict between rationalization and innovative efforts may be weakened (although not entirely
eliminated) if the managers are foreseeing and competent enough to combine the two activities for
instance by pursuing a ‘mass customization’ strategy. The strategy is based on flexible production
techniques and the creation of unique products (Utterback, pp. 97-99). In fact, successful companies on
world markets seem to be both cost effective and innovative in comparison to other companies
(Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademien, 1991).25
at a stronger external pressure. A conclusion that firms prioritize rationalization in this
situation was in fact disputed in Section 3.2. Managers will abandon a tendency to be
too optimistic about a status-quo strategy and too concerned about the short-run
sacrifices of a radical transformation when the external pressure is tightened. Firms
that remain irrational may also choose a radical transformation in periods of a hard
external pressure. As managers tend to overreact on extreme and recent outcomes and
disregard their short duration, a more radical change than necessary will occur if
actual profits are drastically reduced in a recession.
Åkerman and Dahmén argue that firms become myopic in a recession. Many
investments in the preceding boom are now considered as unprofitable since they
were based on a too optimistic view of the pace of overall structural change. As firms
have become more myopic, they will probably prefer short-run, cost reducing
measures at the expense of a radical transformation in a recession. A stronger
emphasize by firms on early returns can be represented by a higher discount rate at
investment decisions (cf. Åkerman, 1942, pp. 41-42, Dahmén, 1970, pp. 48-50,
Erixon, 1994, pp. 53-55).
The choice of a status quo strategy in a recession is perhaps better explained by
imperfections on capital markets than by a shortening of time horizons in the firms.
Firms’ willingness and ability to invest, especially in R&D, will decrease when their
profits and thus internal savings are reduced, particularly if the firms are risk averse.
The possibilities to finance investments by external capital may also be reduced in a
recession because of higher risk evaluations by banks. But more important, the theory
of transformation pressure does not preclude that productivity growth is raised by
rationalization rather than by a radical transformation. Rational firms may postpone a
radical transformation to get more information about its consequences or simply reject
it if the expected private rate of return is higher for a status-quo strategy - a profit
decline in a recession is not necessary a long-run threat against a firm that follows this
strategy. Moreover, risk averse firms may avoid a radical transformation if it is more
risky than a status quo strategy. A theory of transformation pressure is only refuted if
the attempts to increase productivity, by whatever means, are not intensified during a
recession. The theory assumes that the use of production slacks and investment
opportunities was deferred during the preceding boom. The recession may then be26
dominated by status-quo choices since the potential for rationalizations is large and
the needs to rely on such measures in order to survive become urgent if capital
markets are imperfect.
The arguments in this section have not crushed the theory of transformation pressure.
But they have put some doubts on a theory that a maximal pressure is always best for
sustainable growth. Two conflicting theories of an optimal pressure are presented
below. The first one assumes that productivity growth will increase at a more pressure
but only up to a certain point. The other theory does not advocate that the pressure
should be watered down, but that periods with a hard pressure are succeeded by
periods in which positive driving forces are predominant.
5.  Two views of the optimal transformation pressure
An obvious hypothesis is that the external pressure on firms in each period must be
sufficiently hard to enforce the firms to be innovative and efficient but not so hard
that their incentives and financial opportunities to make risky R&D investments are
weakened leading, inter alia, to a strong dependency on rationalization in order to
survive. Further, an exceptionally strong pressure may significantly reduce the
possibilities to exploit scale advantages, spread risks and learn by doing. An extreme
pressure may also produce defeatist attitudes and erode the quality of human capital
and decision making in general. A hypothesis about an inverted U can be found in
industrial economics. A stronger competitive pressure will first have a positive effect
on the amount or efficiency of R&D investments although with diminishing returns.
Still higher levels of rivalry will lead to lower innovations. As an approximation,
innovation vigor will culminate under oligopoly conditions (Cohen and Levin, 1989,
p. 1075, Scherer, 1992, pp. 1419-1420). A conclusion that the optimal pressure is
moderate rather than maximal is, in fact, supported by Toynbee (‘the Golden Mean’)
and by Leibenstein in his later writings (Toynbee, Ch. VIII, Leibenstein, 1980, pp. 94-
96, 1984, p. 338). Psychologists have leaned to a similar conclusion - the quality of
decision making is maximized at moderate levels of stress (Mann, pp. 210-211).27
But a hypothesis that productivity growth is maximized at a moderate pressure on
firms in each period is controversial. An exceptionally strong pressure may be
required to make it worth for established firms to undergo a radical transformation
since a switch to new products and technologies is often prevented by high sunk costs.
A severe profit crisis may also be required to break a psychological resistance to
change. For instance, an exceptionally strong competitive pressure may be needed to
break the tendency to status quo because of habitual learning. Further, there is no
general empirical support to a theory that the optimal pressure is moderate. The
hypothesis of an inverted U is not even unequivocally confirmed for ‘mature’
industries where scale advantages and large R&D projects are often important (Cohen
and Levin, pp. 1076-1078, Scherer and Ross, pp. 645-651, Geroski, 1990, pp. 594-
597, 1995, pp. 26-27, Scherer, 1992, pp. 1423-1425).
The objections to a theory that productivity growth is maximized at a moderate
pressure in each period must be taken seriously. Productivity growth may instead be
maximized if periods with a hard pressure are followed by periods with a weak
pressure. In tough periods, firms with low productivity are eliminated or rationalized
and dead-end status quo strategies abandoned. New firms must then be formed and
surviving firms offered a chance of financial and technical consolidation, using scale
advantages and of escaping from one-sided rationalizations.
The thesis that productivity growth is maximized at periodical shifts between hard and
weak pressure can be associated with the Swedish school of industrial economics.
According to Dahmén’s study of Swedish industries in the interwar period,
productivity growth was high because of a hard transformation pressure in the 1920s
and because of a weak pressure in the 1930s.
15 In the 1920s, deflationary monetary
and exchange rate policies resulted, together with fierce international competition -
primarily through innovations by foreign firms and trade liberalization - in a rapid
structural change of Swedish manufacturing and a modernization of leading export
sectors. In the 1930s, a restructured manufacturing sector benefited from
depreciations of the SEK, expansionary monetary policies, protectionism and inter-
                                                       
15 The interwar period is often called the Golden Age of Swedish industry, since production and
productivity growth in Sweden was high then in a historical and international perspective (Maddison,
1992, table 3.1-3.3).28
industrial diffusions of technologies developed in the preceding decades (Dahmén,
1970, Ch. 3 and 16, 1998).
Svennilson’s study of growth of European industries in 1913-1938 was clearly
inspired by Dahmén’s analysis of Sweden. Svennilson confirms Dahmén’s view that
periodical shifts between ‘pressures’ and ‘opportunities’ are growth enhancing. He
expresses the duality in terms of low and high profits – profits must be low in an
industry to avoid a survival of stagnating firms (and plants) but high to finance a
modernization of remaining firms. A characteristic feature of the capitalistic system –
the business cycle – solves the dilemma. Firms are eliminated during recessions when
profits are low and modernized during peaks when profits are high (Svennilson, p.
35).
There is no room in Svennilson (1954), as in Dahmén (1970), for a hypothesis that a
modernization (including a rationalization) of the firms can be delayed by high
profits. Hence, Svennilson defines no microeconomic hypothesis of transformation
pressure. On the contrary, Svennilson claims that profits in an industry might be too
low in economic peaks.
16 Moreover, he interpreted the positive correlation between
productivity and production growth in the interwar period in countries like Sweden as
a ‘Verdoorn effect’ – high output growth has led to high productivity growth and not
the other way round (Svennilson, p. 57). Svennilson’s Keynesian interpretation
excludes the possibility that high demand resulted in serious X-inefficiencies but also
that a successful economic development was established through structural change
and modernization in the depressions. He claims that high demand and low
unemployment will speed up modernization and structural change by raising profits,
labor mobility and wage-earners’ acceptance of technical change (Svennilson, pp. 24,
34-36, 46 and 49-50). Svennilson’s general conclusion that the Verdoorn effect was
decisive during the interwar period rules out a theory that Sweden experienced high
growth in the 1920s because of negative driving forces. Thus, in contrast to Dahmén,
                                                                                                                                                              
16 Svennilson (pp. 9-10 and 34-35). Analogously, in the opposite case of a recession, transformation
pressure may be too weak. A desirable closure of companies is hindered by state subsidies, legislation,
cartels, and labor militancy or by conservative managers/owners (Svennilson, pp. 10, 34-38 and 52).29
Svennilson did not distinguish any qualitative difference in industrial dynamics
between the 1920s and the 1930s.
17
But Dahmén admits that opportunities must also exist in periods of a hard
transformation pressure. Hence, firms must be relieved from pressure in some
dimensions or favored by positive driving forces other than those that are simply the
other side of ‘pressures’. Swedish manufacturing experienced favorable growth
conditions in the 1920s through the combination of hard transformation pressure and
‘opportunities’ such as high autonomous export demand growth and new knowledge
through innovations abroad (Dahmén, 1970, pp. 386-393). These opportunities
stimulated Swedish productivity growth both independently and in conjunction with a
hard transformation pressure.
Dahmén’s study of the Swedish interwar period also indicates that industry and firm
specific conditions may be decisive for economic growth in periods of a hard
transformation pressure. Swedish firms in manufacturing were fast adopters of new
U.S. technologies and organizational models compared with other West European
countries in the 1920s. It is true that the rapid diffusion of U.S. innovations in Sweden
reflected a fundamental outward orientation of firms thus, that Swedish
manufacturing was early exposed for international competition. But the early foreign
orientation of Swedish companies cannot be understood without considering the
strategies and skills of managers and owners or the product composition of the
leading industrial sector. These firm and industry specific conditions are in turn
explained by political, sociological and cultural characteristics of Sweden and by the
nature of Swedish innovations (Erixon, 1997).
A possible objection to a normative theory of periodical shifts between weak and hard
pressure is that large swings in economic activity levels, prices and profits will
hamper economic growth through a negative relationship between investment and
uncertainty (cf. Nakamura, 1999). But above I have emphasized that this theory must,
                                                       
17 However, in the late 1930s and the early 1940s, Svennilson had formulated a microeconomic
hypothesis about transformation pressure. He claimed that the prospects were good for Sweden despite
a forthcoming recession since the creativity and energy of individuals (and political decision-makers)
would be stimulated by ‘increasing difficulties’ (Henriksson, 1990, pp. 93 and 170).30
as the competing theory of a steady moderate pressure, give room for ‘opportunities’
and also for industry and firm specific conditions (managerial competence and
attitudes, work organizations, remuneration systems, terms of employment etc.). A
strong SEK may have been productive in the 1920s because of a unique combination
of industry and firm conditions and of outside pressures and opportunities. Such
combinations may also explain why a weak SEK seems to have encouraged
productivity growth in Swedish industries in the 1930s but not in the 1980s despite
common profit squeezes in the preceding decades. It is perhaps a depressing
conclusion for a macro economist that the optimal character and extent of the
transformation pressure may vary between countries and from time to time.
6.  The core and further development of the theory of transformation pressure
The theory of transformation pressure offers a uniquely Swedish perspective on
economic growth and economic policy. An influential argument from the early 1990s
stated that devaluations of the Swedish currency lessened the external pressure on
manufacturing leading to a delay in structural change, innovations and
rationalizations. Exchange-rate policies are mostly seen in modern economics as a
mean to influence aggregate demand or to reallocate resources between the open and
sheltered sector. The relationship between exchange-rate policies on the one hand and
the incentives and abilities of firm actors to raise productivity on the other hand is
seldom accounted for.
A fundamental idea in the theory of transformation pressure is that firms will only
react to challenges that are close at hand or have already occurred. I have presented
three separate explanations for why productivity growth will first increase when the
external pressure has been obviously raised: firms have no reliable information about
the nature and extent of inevitable threats until they show up, the psychological
resistance to a (radical) transformation can only be broken by an immediate threat,
and skill formation and creativity are stimulated by real difficulties - necessity is the
mother of invention. However, an unconditional theory of transformation pressure
must be refused on both principal and empirical grounds. Productivity growth is not
always stimulated by harder external circumstances. A qualified theory of31
transformation pressure says that the optimal external pressure in each period is
moderate, a theory that is compatible with the inverted-U hypothesis in modern
industrial economics. According to a rival theory, emphasized in the Swedish school
of industrial economics, productivity growth will be maximized if there are periodical
shifts between hard and weak pressures. For instance, firms must be pushed into a
more favorable growth path and then be permitted to enjoy the virtuous circles of
growth. However, a qualified theory must give room, even in periods of a hard
transformation pressure, for positive driving forces and also for firm and industry
specific conditions. A hard-currency policy is not a sufficient condition for high
productivity growth; the policy may even be growth dampening if the proper
incentives and capacities are missing in the firms.
A microeconomic perspective on the relationship between external pressure and
productivity growth has some limitations and must therefore be combined with a
structural approach. The structural analysis, which in fact is predominant in the
Swedish school of industrial economics, can be industry specific or pursued in terms
of changes in sectors’ share of aggregate production. One example of a structural
relationship between external pressure and productivity growth has already been
mentioned - the stagnation and exit of firms that have been hit by external pressure
but not succeeded to transform will free resources for the expansion of dynamic firms.
But there are many other examples of a structural relationship between external
pressure and productivity growth. Devaluations may influence overall productivity
growth by their effects on, for instance, the relative size of the exposed, R&D and
capital-intensive sectors and also on new firms’ share of total production (Erixon,
1991b, pp. 294-302). New firms are not particularly favored by a devaluation since
they, in general, are less exposed for foreign competition and also less benefited by
higher aggregate demand - the formation of new firms is often prevented by entry
barriers. New firms may on the contrary be disfavored by higher nominal wages and
interest rates and by the fact that high profits make it easier for established firms to
attract risk capital and credits at capital rationing (cf. Svennilson, pp. 24, 34-36, 49-
50). It is true that a devaluation can encourage productivity growth in a country by
putting a stronger transformation pressure on new firms and extending the financial
opportunities for established firms. But overall productivity growth is reduced ceteris
paribus by a devaluation if new firms’ share of total production declines and32
productivity growth or productivity levels are higher in new firms than in established
ones. The example shows that a general theory of why productivity growth is affected
by transformation pressure must take account of changes not only in firm behavior
and skills but also in industrial composition.
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